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ABSTRACT 
We examine the payout policy of U.S. firms over the period 1980-2008. Prior research indicates 
that firm characteristics, managerial preferences, and investor clienteles are all important factors 
in setting payout policy. Counter to the oft-reported positive relation between senior citizens and 
the use of dividends, our results indicate that senior citizens are either indifferent between 
dividends and repurchases or demand dividends and have no influence over firm policy. The 
evolution of firm characteristics, including the average firm size, age, and volatility of earnings 
over time best explains payout policy. Further, manager preference for flexibility drives the 
payout decision. 
 
 
 
 
JEL classification: G35   
Keywords:  Payout Policy, Clientele Effect 
  
1 
 
1. Introduction 
 We examine two possible drivers of firm payout policy: senior citizen clientele and firm 
characteristics. Managers have increasingly preferred flexibility when setting payout policy 
(Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely, 2005). Repurchases are thought to provide more 
flexibility than dividends, particularly when earnings are volatile. In addition to the average firm 
becoming younger and smaller over time, the preference for this flexibility is attributed to the 
diminishing propensity to pay dividends (Fama and French, 2001; Skinner, 2008). Both age and 
tax-based clientele theories indicate that certain investors may demand dividends, which may 
conflict with management preferences. We examine these non-exhaustive and non-mutually 
exclusive potential drivers in order to gain a better understanding of the determinants of payout 
policy.  
Senior investors are commonly believed to prefer dividends to repurchases or capital 
gains.
1
 This fact, combined with the observation that individual investors prefer local stocks 
(Ivkovic and Weisbenner, 2005), implies that firms headquartered in counties with a high 
proportion of dividends may be catering to seniors. However, over the last 30 years, the 
proportion of seniors has increased while the relative use of dividends has declined. The time-
series relation between seniors and payout policy is unclear a priori. We utilize the full panel of 
data over this period to analyze both cross-sectional and time-series implications.  
There are three possible relations between seniors and payout policy. Senior proportion 
may be unrelated, positively related, or negatively related to the use of dividends. The first 
possibility would be consistent with an insignificant relation between payout and seniors and 
may be due to indifference by seniors. Under the indifference scenario, forces other than 
demographics drive payout policy, and seniors do not seek to interfere with these forces via 
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 See, for example, Thaler and Shefrin (1981), Shefrin and Statman (1984), and Scholz (1992). 
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payout demands. Miller and Modigliani (1961) show that payout policy is irrelevant under a 
range of assumptions, although dividends may appear to be related to firm value because of an 
information effect. DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2006) show that payout policy is not irrelevant to 
firm value when constraints from Miller and Modigliani (1961) are relaxed. However, since both 
dividends and repurchases are generally found to be positive signals, the choice between the two 
payout methods may be irrelevant.
2
  We note that this explanation does not conflict with the fact 
that the use of dividends has decreased over time while the proportion of seniors in the U.S. has 
increased.  It may be that forces other than demographics drive payout policy and that senior 
citizenship has increased and dividends have decreased over the same period merely by 
coincidence. 
A second possibility is that seniors demand dividends. Becker et al. (2011) find empirical 
evidence of this in cross-sectional tests, and we confirm these cross-sectional results in our 
robustness section. They note several possible explanations for the observed results. The demand 
for dividends may be due to consumption purposes (Miller and Modigliani, 1961; Shefrin and 
Thaler, 1998), self-control (Thaler and Shefrin, 1981), mental accounting (Shefrin and Statman, 
1981), or tax motives (Scholz, 1992). The tax argument notes that seniors may have lower 
dividend tax rates than younger investors. However, as we consider in detail, dividends have 
historically been taxed at a higher rate than capital gains. As such, the tax motives may not 
provide a clear prediction. Regardless of the cause, in this scenario firms respond to current 
shareholder demands, and when there is a large presence of seniors, firms increase dividends. 
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 See Healy and Palepu (1988) and Grullon, Michaely, and Swaminathan (2002) for market reactions to dividends. 
See Grullon and Michaely (2004) for market reactions to repurchases. See Ha, Hong, and Lee (2011) for the 
information content (i.e., signaling effect) of dividends and share repurchases.  Ha et al. (2011) show that broad 
dividends, which include both narrow cash dividends and share repurchases, signal both current undervaluation and 
future cash flows, which suggests that dividends and share repurchases are complementary in their signaling role by 
paying out permanent and temporary earnings, respectively. 
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Thus, we might expect to find a positive relation between the propensity to pay dividends and the 
proportion of seniors.    
A third possibility is that, counter to the senior clientele theory and empirical evidence 
from Becker et al. (2011), seniors may prefer repurchases to dividends.  This may be related to 
the tax implications for clienteles noted by Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2008). 
Specifically, the U.S. tax code has traditionally applied a higher tax rate to dividends relative to 
capital gains. Prior to the 2003 tax law change, the top tax rate for dividends was 38.6% 
compared to 20% as the top capital gains rate. Under these conditions, seniors may prefer 
repurchases to dividends in order to time their earnings and to pay less tax. After 2003, when the 
highest tax rates for both dividends and capital gains were lowered to 15%, seniors should have 
theoretically been indifferent between dividends and repurchases with respect to tax 
implications. Under this scenario, we would expect to see a negative (positive) relation between 
proportion of seniors and dividends (repurchases) prior to 2003 and no relation after 2003. 
We find the change in senior proportion in a county is unrelated to both dividends and 
repurchases, regardless of how the payout variables are measured. This is true in both cross-
sectional and time-series analysis. Instead of the positive relation between the level of seniors 
and the use of dividends found in Becker et al. (2011), we initially observe a significant and 
negative relation based on the change in seniors over time when we utilize the control variables 
of their paper. We utilize a full time series of yearly population data from 1980-2008. Our 
analysis indicates that the proportion of seniors is increasing over time (i.e., non-stationary); 
thus, we take this into account in our analysis by using the change in proportion of seniors, 
which is more appropriate and results in an improvement over using levels.
3
 A negative relation 
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 Nonstationarity of regressors with a stationary dependent variable creates a bias against rejecting a false null 
hypothesis (e.g., Granger and Newbold, 1974; Baffes, 1997).  In this case, Granger and Newbold (1974) and others 
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is consistent with the third alternative referenced above, namely, that seniors prefer repurchases. 
However, after making empirical adjustments, the evidence supports the first possibility. Indeed, 
we find that once firm age, size, and earnings volatility (earnings growth volatility) are 
considered, there is no longer a significant relation between the proportion of seniors and payout 
policy. Further, the inclusion of these variables in the cross-sectional tests of Becker et al. (2011) 
reduces or eliminates the significance of the senior variable. This suggests that the inclusion of 
dynamic factors (i.e., earnings volatility) dominates the impact of a senior clientele. It is possible 
that seniors do in fact demand dividends, but firms do not cater to the preferences of the senior 
clientele. This may be particularly true of large firms which are less likely to respond to the 
demands of local individual investors. The observed relation in our paper then does not 
necessarily rule out a senior clientele. Rather, our results suggest that managerial preferences for 
flexibility combined with changing firm characteristics dominate senior clientele demand.  
We attempt to determine if senior investors are indifferent or if their demands are 
ignored. We do this by focusing on firm size. Large firms, with more dispersed ownership on 
average, are less likely to respond to individual investor demand. We note that seniors’ holdings 
represent a reasonably large proportion of all investments. As such, firms that ignore their 
preferences may alienate senior investors and thus face negative value implications.
4
 We test this 
possibility by examining the interaction between a dummy variable for small firms and the 
change in seniors in our regressions. Theoretically, smaller firms should be relatively more likely 
to cater to local senior dividend demand. The interaction is negatively related to whether a firm 
pays dividends and is unrelated to the proportion of payout in dividends in our regressions. This 
indicates that senior proportion increases, in areas with small firms, are particularly related to a 
                                                                                                                                                             
suggest that we should use a first-differenced variable. As an alternative way to address this issue, Granger and 
Newbold (1974) also suggest that models should be built with both levels and changes.  
4
 Becker et al. (2011) estimate that seniors represent 5%-6% of total stock ownership. 
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lower propensity to pay dividends. Thus, it is less likely that firms ignore the dividend demand of 
seniors and more likely that seniors do not particularly demand dividends.    
We test the explanation that seniors demand repurchases, due to tax incentives, by 
including an interaction measure between a post-2003 tax reduction dummy and the senior 
proportion. We find that the senior proportion is negatively (not) related to the use of dividends 
relative to repurchases prior to (after) 2003. Thus, consistent with a senior repurchase clientele, 
we find evidence that seniors demand repurchases when capital gains have a relative tax 
advantage over dividends and are otherwise indifferent.  
Our trivariate Granger-causality approach considers the ability of lagged senior 
proportion and lagged firm earnings volatility to predict current payout policy while controlling 
for past payout policy. Our results confirm that the proportion of seniors does not Granger-cause 
firm payout decisions. Further, our results indicate that the use of repurchases is positively 
Granger-caused by volatile earnings. Thus, our dynamic analysis suggests that firm 
characteristics, coupled with manager preference for flexibility, are more relevant than senior 
demand when making payout decisions. 
Becker et al. (2011) focus on census population data from the years of 1980, 1990, and 
2000 and find that dividend demand by seniors is an important determinant of payout policy in 
the cross-section. Similarly, Graham and Kumar (2006) find trading patterns in retail investors 
consistent with age and tax clienteles. With respect to time-series implications of an age-based 
clientele, Becker et al. (2011) suggest that, “While the dividend-demand hypothesis has strong 
cross-sectional predictions (companies located in areas with a larger fraction of seniors are more 
likely to pay dividends), it is unlikely to have affected the aggregate time series of dividend 
payments.” They believe the lack of a time-series relation is due to the stability of the proportion 
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of seniors over time, but do not explicitly consider a time-series analysis. They do perform an 
indirect analysis of the change in the proportion of seniors by examining firm headquarter 
changes. Although their comment suggests that an insignificant relation between seniors and 
dividends in the time series would not be surprising, it is nonetheless important to examine 
explicitly. As discussed above, the a priori time series relation is not clear. Further, as Fama and 
French (2001) find that dynamic firm characteristics best explain dynamic payout policy, it is 
useful to see if this general finding holds when considering potentially powerful shifts in investor 
demographics. Indeed, we find that either correcting the regression approach to account for the 
change in the proportion of seniors or including dynamic firm factors such as earnings volatility 
(while leaving the econometric approach unchanged) yields an insignificant relation between 
seniors and the use of dividends.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the data and 
methodology used in this study. In section 3 we present the results of our empirical analysis. We 
conclude in section 4. 
 
2. Data and Methodology 
2.1 Data 
We collect accounting data, including data on dividends and repurchases, from 
Compustat. Additionally, like Becker et al. (2011), we utilize corporate headquarter data from 
Compustat to denote firm location. This approach was first taken by Coval and Moskowitz 
(1999, 2001) and later by Ivković and Weisbenner (2005). 
  Returns and ex-dividend dates are taken from CRSP. We consider two definitions of 
dividends: ordinary quarterly dividends (distribution code 1232) as well as all ordinary 
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dividends, which, in addition to ordinary quarterly dividends, includes ordinary semiannual 
(code 1242) and ordinary annual (code 1252) issuances. While the results herein are based on 
ordinary quarterly dividends, the conclusions reached are identical for the wider specification of 
dividends. We collect price and shares outstanding data from CRSP as well in order to control 
for size in our regression analysis. Size for year t is calculated based on CRSP data in December 
of year t-1. 
  In order to determine the prevalence of seniors in a given county, data from the U.S. 
Census is gathered and matched at the county level, based on the corporate headquarters 
information taken from Compustat. Becker et al. (2011) utilize data on seniors at the county level 
from the census years of 1980, 1990, and 2000. We, however, take advantage of the full time 
series and utilize the full panel of population estimates for each year over the period from 1980-
2008.
5
 Senior citizens are those aged 65 or older. We track, over time, the proportion of citizens  
in a county that are senior citizens. Specifically, the variable Seniors is the proportion of seniors 
(the number of citizens over the age of 65 in a given county-year divided by the total number of 
citizens in the county-year). 
 
2.2 Regression Methodology 
As in Becker et al. (2011), we use payout variables as the dependent variables in our 
empirical model. Payer is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm paid a dividend in a given 
year and zero otherwise. Initiate is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm began paying 
dividends in a given year and zero otherwise. Dividend Yield is a firm’s dividend yield for the 
year. Repurchase Yield is the firm’s repurchase yield for the year. We consider additional payout 
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1980, 1990 and 2000 are exact numbers, taken from the U.S. Census Bureau. Figures from intervening years are 
based on population estimates. Estimates augment census levels by the use of actual birth, death, and migration data. 
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variables. We follow Skinner (2008) and create, Dividend (Repurchase) Proportion, which is the 
dollar amount of dividends (repurchases) for a given firm year divided by the total firm payout 
for the same year. Skinner (2008) uses these variables to document the increasing prevalence of 
repurchases relative to dividends.  Payout Ratio is the sum of dividends and repurchases divided 
by market capitalization for a given firm-year.   
We utilize the same control variables as Becker et al. (2011). Specifically, we include Net 
Income, Cash, and Long-Term Debt, which are each scaled by total assets. Q is approximated 
using the market-to-book ratio. Volatility is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over 
the prior two years. Two-year Lagged Return is the compound monthly stock return of the past 
two years. Asset Growth is the natural log of the growth rate of assets over the prior year. 
Additionally, we include age-group indicator variables, which are dummies for firms between 1-
5, 6-10, 11-15, and 16-20 years old, as well as industry-year interaction and state-year interaction 
dummy variables. Robust standard errors, based on firm clustering, are used in all regressions.  
In addition to the controls used in Becker et al. (2011), we include Age which is the 
number of years since the firms’ IPO. Size is the natural log of firm market value. Age and Size 
are included given that Fama and French (2001) find that the decline in the propensity to pay 
dividends is due in part to the average firm being smaller and younger over time. We include 
Earnings Volatility which is the standard deviation of operating income over the previous five 
years from year -4 to 0. These variables are included as dividends are more likely to be 
associated with stable and permanent earnings, while repurchases are more likely to be 
associated with more volatile and temporary earnings as well as more volatile earnings growth.
6
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 See, for example, Lee (1996), Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach (2000), Guay and Harford (2000), Lie (2000), 
Kumar and Lee (2001), Lee and Rui (2007), and Lee and Suh (2011). 
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We further expand the approach of Becker et al. (2011) by considering all county-years 
between 1980 and 2008. This allows us to account for time-series dimensions not possible with 
their sample which concentrates on census years only. Thus, we offer both cross-sectional and 
time-series evidence.  
 
2.3 Granger-causality 
 As we have a full time series of senior proportion (i.e., Seniors) data, we are able to 
examine the dynamic causal relation between seniors and firm payout. A dynamic analog to our 
previous questions of interest is to test if senior variable Granger-causes firm payout. 
Additionally, we test if earnings volatility Granger-causes firm payout. We specify the following 
trivariate vector autoregression (TVAR) model for the full panel of our data: 
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 ] for i, j = 1, 2, 3.  
Payout is the firm payout considered in the analysis. We examine Dividend Payer, 
Dividend Yield, Dividend Proportion, and Repurchase Yield as payout variables. Seniors is either 
the level or change in seniors. Earnings Vol is earnings volatility. All variables are defined as 
above with one exception. Unlike the county level data used above, in our Granger-causality 
analysis we use aggregate data. In order to do this, we generate a national proportion of seniors 
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for each year, as well as aggregate payout and earnings volatility variables based on the average 
firm in a given year. We use the lag length k = 2.
7
 
 Seniors is said to Granger-cause Payout if we reject the following null hypothesis: 
H0: )(12 LA = 0 (i.e., 12( )A s = 0 for all s).                                                                         (2)    
In other words, if we reject the null hypothesis in equation (2), then it indicates that lagged 
Seniors help better predict current payout after controlling for past payout and past earnings 
volatility. We also examine the net (cumulative) effect of lagged Seniors on current payout as 
follows: 
H0 : 12
1
( )
k
s
A s

  = 0.                   (3)   
In testing the null hypothesis in equation (3), we are able to assign a direction to the observed 
causality. We are also interested in testing if Earnings Vol may Granger-cause Payout. Earnings 
Vol is said to Granger-cause Payout if we reject the following null hypothesis: 
H0: 13( )A L = 0 (i.e., 13( )A s = 0 for all s).                                                           (4) 
Additionally, we are interested in the net (cumulative) effect of Earnings Vol on Payout. Thus, 
we test: 
H0 : ∑ 13( )A s
 
     = 0.                                                                                                        (5) 
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 Lag length is based on the frequently used AIC (Akaike, 1974) and Schwarz Bayesian information criterion 
(SBIC).  Both yield the same lag in our sample.  
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2.4 Summary Statistics and Stationarity Tests 
Summary statistics of the variables used in our regressions are presented in Panel A of 
Table 1. Although our sample period differs from Becker et al. (2011), our sample statistics 
indicate that both our payout and senior variables are similar in value. We compare the average 
percent of firms paying dividends of 47% in Becker et al. (2011) to our sample, for which the 
average is around 39.67%, and conclude the samples are similar despite different coverage with 
respect to the specific years included. We find that, consistent with Becker et al. (2011), the 
average proportion of seniors in a given county for our sample is around 12%. Our sample 
exhibits significant variation among counties in the proportion of seniors as the minimum 
proportion is 3% and the maximum is 33%. Additionally, we find that the median year-over-year 
change in seniors is around 0.10% with a minimum change of a nearly 14% reduction and 
maximum change of a nearly 22% increase. We winsorize year-over-year change in seniors at 
the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentile in our regression analysis in order to mitigate the impact of outliers in 
our sample.
8
  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 The use of the full panel of the senior variable leads to an important difference in our 
approach from previous literature. It is desirable for both left- and right-hand side variables in a 
regression to be stationary. If a variable is found to be non-stationary through unit root tests, the 
change in the variable needs to be used. However, using the change in a variable that is already 
stationary creates its own problems (i.e., a potential over-differencing issue which could lead to 
less stable coefficient estimates). Thus, it is important to carefully identify the stationarity of 
each variable. We examine this issue using the panel stationarity tests of Hadri (2000) and  Im, 
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 Our results are qualitatively identical when we do not control for outliers in our key variable and are available 
upon request. 
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Pesaran, and Shin (2003) (IPS). While the former tests a null hypothesis of all panels being 
stationary, the latter test assumes that all panels are non-stationary under the null. These statistics 
are chosen because they are designed for panels with a large number of observations but a 
relatively small number of periods. 
The results of our panel stationarity tests are found in Panel B of Table 1. We conduct the 
unit root test on firms that are present for the period from 1990 to 2008 in order to ensure a large 
enough sample as well as a long enough time period to provide an adequate test of stationarity.
9
 
We find that the null of all panels being stationary is rejected for Seniors as well as all control 
variables. This indicates that all variables considered are non-stationary. However, the Hadri 
(2000) test uses a null that ALL panels are stationary, which makes rejection of the null very 
likely with a large number of panels. This motivates our additional consideration of the IPS test 
which uses a null of non-stationary. This test only assumes non-stationarity in a large proportion 
of the panels, as opposed to ALL panels as in Hadri (2000). We fail to reject the null of non-
stationarity for Seniors and Size (Log of Market Value). For these variables, the results suggest 
that we are unable to assume stationarity. Thus, Seniors and Size (Log of Market Value) warrant 
the use of the change (i.e., first difference) in our regressions. We thus create Change in Seniors 
(Change in Size) which is the county proportion of seniors (market value) in year t, minus the 
county proportion of seniors (market value) in year t – 1.  
 
3. Results 
3.1 Change in Seniors Panel Regressions 
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 Results are robust to examining firms that are present for the entire period from 1980 to 2008 as well as to focusing 
on each respective decade (i.e., 1980 to 1989, 1990-1999, and 2000 to 2008). 
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Figure 1 shows the time series of the average proportion of seniors in the U.S., the 
average firm’s propensity to pay dividends, the proportion of total payout issued in the form of 
repurchases, and earnings volatility. While the proportion of seniors has steadily increased over 
the 1980-2008 period, the propensity to pay dividends has declined and the proportion of payout 
in the form of repurchases has increased. At first inspection, this figure is not consistent with 
seniors demanding dividends. We note that the pattern observed over time for earnings volatility 
closely matches the pattern for the relative use of repurchases. Thus, the figure is consistent with 
either senior preference for repurchases, or senior indifference to payout policy combined with 
other non-demographic factors (i.e., increased volatility of earnings), or senior demand for 
dividends but a lack of influence over policy. We provide more rigorous tests of the relation 
below.   
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
In Table 2, we use county level sorts, based on the change in proportion of seniors over 
the time period examined. This provides a longer horizon view of the role that changing 
demographics plays in payout policy. In our analysis, we require counties to have at least 3 
incorporated firms in order to be included in the sample. This is done in order to make county 
comparisons more balanced in terms of number of firms.
10
 We sort our sample into quintiles 
such that quintile 1 (5) contains the counties with the smallest (largest) influx of seniors.
11
 
Within each quintile, firms are aggregated so that county affiliation is no longer relevant. 
Dividend Payer% is the percentage of firms that pay dividends. Dividend Proportion% is the 
percentage of distributions that are granted via dividends. 
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 This results in less than 8% of firms and less than 5% of total market capitalization being excluded and does not 
change the interpretation of our results. 
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 Note that quintile 1 includes counties with a decline in the proportion of seniors over the decade. 
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We implement the sort for each decade (i.e., 1980-1989, 1990-1999, and 2000-2008), 
separately. In Table 2, when focusing on the 1980-1989 period, quintile 5 (the quintile with the 
greatest influx of seniors) is the third highest quintile with respect to proportion of dividend 
payers, as well as payout distributed via dividends. For the (1980-1989) decade, there appears to 
be no discernible relation between influx in seniors and payout policy. For the 1990-1999 period, 
quintile 5 is associated with the third highest Dividend Payer% and the lowest Dividend 
Proportion%. Thus, for this period, an influx in seniors appears unrelated to the propensity to 
pay dividends. However, change in seniors is negatively related to proportion of payout via 
dividends. Finally, for the 2000-2008 period, quintile 5 is associated with a nearly 20% lower 
Dividend Payer% and 11% lower Dividend Proportion% than quintile 1. This evidence suggests 
that when examining longer-horizon population changes, an influx in seniors is negatively 
related to the use of dividends in both a relative and absolute sense.  
One possible explanation for this result is that firms in counties with an influx of seniors 
may exhibit characteristics consistent with non-dividend paying firms. This explanation is 
consistent with the observation from Table 2 that counties in quintile 5 are the smallest firms in 
terms of market capitalization for all three decades. We further examine the role of firm 
characteristics in subsequent tests. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Table 3 provides a more rigorous framework to examine the relation observed in Figure 1 
and Table 2. Like Becker et al. (2011), we regress dividend payout variables on our measures of 
seniors and controls. Consistent with Figure 1 and Table 2, we find a negative and significant (at 
the 5% level) coefficient for change in seniors in the dividend payer specification. Thus, an 
increase in seniors in a given county is associated with a reduction in the propensity of firms in 
15 
 
that county to pay dividends. This is directly contrary to the existence of a senior dividend 
clientele effect. Change in seniors is not significantly related to firms initiating dividends or to 
dividend yield. The insignificance in these specifications is consistent with senior indifference 
with respect to dividends. Change in seniors is negatively related to the proportion of payout 
distributed via dividends (significant at the 5% level). This is consistent with firms becoming 
less likely to pay dividends over time, even as the proportion of seniors has increased. Further, 
this suggests that the proportion of payout in the form of repurchases is positively related to an 
increase in seniors. We note that Volatility is negative and significantly (at the 1% level) related 
to all dividend variables. Thus, regardless of how we measure the use of dividends, firms with 
more volatile stock returns are less likely to use dividends. This suggests that firm 
characteristics, coupled with managerial preference for flexibility, play an important role in 
setting payout policy.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 Seniors may demand repurchases in favor of dividends on the basis of the historical tax 
advantages of capital gains relative to dividends. The senior dividend clientele theory, however, 
suggests there should be no relation between seniors and the firm’s propensity to repurchase. In 
Table 4 we repeat our regressions from Table 3 except we use Repurchase Yield, Repurchase 
Proportion, and Payout Ratio as dependent variables. 
 In Table 4, Repurchase Yield is not related to the change in senior proportion. This is 
consistent with Becker et al. (2011) and suggests that seniors do not demand more repurchases in 
an absolute sense. As Repurchase Proportion is just (1 – Dividend Proportion), defined for 
Table 3, it is not surprising that we find that change in seniors is positively related to Repurchase 
Proportion (significant at the 5% level). Thus, an increase in seniors is related to a greater 
16 
 
portion of firm payout via repurchases. This may be due to firms ignoring the wishes of the 
senior dividend clientele, or to the trend of U.S. firms paying a larger portion of distributions via 
repurchases while seniors are indifferent between dividends and repurchases, or to seniors’ 
relative preference for repurchases based on tax considerations. Payout Ratio is not related to 
change in senior proportion. An increase in seniors then is not related to how much a firm pays 
out, but is associated with how the firm decides to distribute payout. This is consistent with 
senior indifference with respect to the level of payout and with a preference by seniors to receive 
repurchases given that a firm has already decided to pay distributions. We note that Volatility is 
positively and significantly related (at the 1% level) to all repurchase variables. This is consistent 
with managers preferring repurchases to dividends due to the desire for flexibility in relatively 
uncertain times.  
 [Insert Table 4 here] 
 We note that a positive relation between Repurchase Proportion and change in seniors 
does not necessarily suggest that seniors prefer repurchases. It could still be the case that seniors’ 
demands are ignored or that the choice between dividends and repurchases is irrelevant for 
seniors. However, irrelevancy alone does not fully explain our results as we do not observe an 
insignificant relation between change in seniors and payout variables. Instead, we observe a 
significant and negative relation between change in seniors and the use of the dividends. One 
potential explanation is that firms headquartered in counties with increasing senior populations 
happen to exhibit characteristics of non-dividend paying firms. We found preliminary evidence 
of this in the Table 2 sorts in which we observed that firms in counties with the largest decade 
increases in seniors were smaller, on average, than other firms.  
17 
 
We provide a more rigorous analysis of the relation between change in seniors and firm 
characteristics in Table 5. We use the same control variables as in previous regressions and focus 
on dependent variables for Size, Age, Earnings Volatility (Earnings Growth Volatility), and 
Profit, which are measured by the log of market value, years since IPO, the standard deviation of 
earnings (growth) over the five-year period from year -4 through 0, and net income divided by 
equity, respectively.
12
 
 Consistent with our sorting results in Table 2, Size is negatively related to change in 
seniors (significant at the 1% level). Firms headquartered in counties with more rapidly aging 
populations tend to be smaller. As we know that smaller firms are, on average, less likely to pay 
dividends, this may provide an explanation for our observed results. We would also expect 
younger firms to be less likely to pay dividends. Age is negatively related to change in seniors 
(significant at the 1% level), which is also consistent with firms headquartered in aging counties 
exhibiting characteristics of non-dividend paying firms. Dividends are more likely to be 
associated with stable and permanent earnings, while repurchases are more likely to be 
associated with more volatile and temporary earnings.
13
 Earnings Volatility and Earnings 
Growth Volatility are positively related to change in seniors (significant at the 1% level). As the 
average U.S. firm has become relatively smaller and younger over time, the average volatility of 
firm earnings has increased. Profit is not related to change in seniors. Based on this variable, it 
does not appear that firm performance is significantly different in counties with an influx of 
seniors.  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
                                                 
12
 Our definition of earnings volatility is from Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach (2000). 
13
 See, for example, Lee (1996), Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach (2000), Guay and Harford (2000), Lie 
(2000), Kumar and Lee (2001), Lee and Rui (2007), and Lee and Suh (2011). 
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 Table 5 demonstrates that counties with an increase of seniors contain smaller and 
younger firms and firms with more volatile earnings on average. Although we already control for 
the assets of the firm and also include age dummies, we add Size, Age, and Earnings Volatility to 
the existing controls in Table 6 in order to explicitly account for these characteristics. After 
adding the new controls, the coefficient of Change in Seniors is insignificant for all payout 
dependent variables.
14
 Thus, with respect to the payout decision, our results suggest seniors are 
not a significant factor, and the previously observed negative relation in Tables 2 and 3 is likely 
due to other established payout factors. This is consistent with senior indifference to dividend 
policy or lack of senior influence over firm policy.
15
 Further, the results suggest that factors 
related to management preferences (i.e., the desire for flexibility) and the evolution of firm 
characteristics are the major drivers of payout policy. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 Another possibility is that, despite the observed negative relation between seniors and 
dividends found in Tables 2 and 3 and the insignificant relation in Table 6, seniors do in fact 
demand dividends, but large firms ignore this desire. In Table 7, we interact a dummy variable 
for small firm status (below median market capitalization) with our Change in Seniors variable. 
We maintain the same regression framework as previously undertaken and focus on the 
dependent variables Dividend Payer, Dividend Proportion, and Payout Ratio. 
 We find that the interaction between small firms and the change in seniors is negative and 
significant at the 5% level (insignificant) when Dividend Payer (Dividend Proportion and 
Payout Ratio) is the dependent variable. With respect to the negative relation when Dividend 
Payer is the dependent variable, the results suggest that even for the firms most likely to respond 
                                                 
14
 Results are qualitatively identical when using Earnings Growth Volatility instead of Earnings Volatility. 
15
 We do not include Profit in the reported results as it is not significantly related to change in seniors. However, in 
unreported results, our conclusions are qualitatively identical when controlling for this variables. 
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to investor demand, the relation between senior proportion and the decision to pay dividends is 
negative. Additionally, Change in Seniors is insignificant in all three regressions. Consistent 
with Table 6, further controlling for firm size, age and earnings volatility renders the relation 
between Change in Seniors and payout variables insignificant.  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 The third possible explanation for the negative relation between seniors and dividends 
found in Tables 2 and 3 and the insignificant relation in Table 6 is that seniors demand 
repurchases. Seniors may prefer repurchases to dividends when capital gains are given 
preferential tax treatment relative to dividends. This describes the U.S. tax code prior to the 2003 
tax code revisions. Thus, in Table 8 we include controls used in previous regressions and add a 
dummy variable for years after 2003 and an interaction between the post-2003 period and 
Change in Seniors. In all specifications, the post 2003 interaction with Change in Seniors is 
unrelated to the payout variables.  
If seniors prefer repurchases for tax reasons, we would expect to see a negative and 
significant relation (insignificant relation) between Dividend Proportion and Change in Seniors 
for the period before (after) 2003. Consistent with this explanation, we find that Change in 
Seniors is negative and significant (at the 5% level) when Dividend Proportion is the dependent 
variable for the pre-2003 period. Further, the interaction between the post-2003 period and 
Change in Seniors is unrelated to Dividend Proportion. Combining this result with the Dividend 
Payer results suggests that seniors do not seek out dividend paying firms, a result that holds even 
after revisions to the U.S. tax code treat capital gains and dividends identically. Given that a firm 
is paying out earnings, seniors are associated with firms that issue a relatively larger proportion 
of repurchases relative to dividends before the tax cuts of 2003 and are not associated with this 
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proportion after the tax cuts of 2003. Consistent with the overall decline in the use of dividends, 
the Post 2003 dummy variable is negative and significant in all specifications.     
[Insert Table 8 here] 
3.2 Granger-causality 
 It is possible that demographic changes have a dynamic relation to current payout policy. 
It is also possible that earnings volatility causes payout policy. In Table 9 we perform Granger-
causality tests which allow us to address these issues. Unlike previous regressions, the Granger-
causality tests in Table 9 focus on aggregate data. Specifically, we generate a national proportion 
of seniors for a given year and combine this data with average firm information for a given year. 
Thus, Table 9 provides a unique way to examine the relation between seniors and payout 
variables. We use a trivariate model that simultaneously considers the ability of lagged payout 
variables, lagged seniors and lagged earnings volatility to predict current payout policy.  
 At the top of Table 9, we present results which consider whether seniors and earnings 
volatility Granger-cause Dividend Payer. We examine both the non-stationary Level of Seniors 
variable from Becker et al. (2011) and the stationary Change in Seniors variable discussed earlier 
in this paper as proxies for seniors. We find that Change in Seniors (Level of Seniors) Granger-
causes (does not Granger-cause) Dividend Payer. In other words, after controlling for past 
payout policy and earnings volatility, lagged changes in senior proportion help us better predict 
whether a firm pays dividends. However, the net (cumulative) effect of the relation is 
insignificant. Therefore, there is no evidence in the net (cumulative) effect test that seniors have 
a preference for dividends. In both tests, Earnings Volatility is unrelated to Dividend Payer.
16
  
                                                 
16
 We have conducted this analysis using Earnings Growth Volatility and the results, although omitted for brevity, 
are qualitatively identical to those reported. 
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In the second panel of Table 9, we consider whether seniors and earnings volatility 
Granger-cause Dividend Yield. For both the seniors and earnings volatility variables, there is not 
a significant relation with respect to Dividend Yield. 
In the third panel of Table 9, we examine whether seniors and earnings volatility 
Granger-cause Dividend Proportion. We find that Level of Seniors Granger-causes Dividend 
Proportion and that the net (cumulative) effect of the relation is negative (both tests significant at 
the 1% level). We find that Change in Seniors is unrelated to Dividend Proportion. The results 
are further evidence of the importance of correctly specifying the senior variable. Using lagged 
Level of Seniors addresses the dynamic causal impact of the variable. Doing so leads to the 
opposite conclusions of Becker et al. (2011), who examine Level of Seniors only in the cross-
section. Further, when we use Change in Seniors there is no longer a causal relation between 
senior proportion and Dividend Proportion. For this and other dividend variables, Earnings 
Volatility does not generally Granger-cause dividends (with the exception of Dividend 
Proportion when we use Change in Seniors).  
In the fourth panel of Table 9, we present results which consider whether seniors and 
earnings volatility Granger-cause Repurchase Yield. Neither Level of Seniors nor Change in 
Seniors Granger-causes Repurchase Yield. However, Earnings Volatility does Granger-cause 
Repurchase Yield (significant at the 1% level) regardless of the senior variable used. Further, the 
net (cumulative) effect of Earnings Volatility is positive for Repurchase Yield (significant at the 
5% level). This is consistent with management preferring flexibility in payout policy decisions, 
especially given certain firm characteristics. Specifically, when earnings are more volatile and 
less permanent, managers prefer to use repurchases for payout in order to avoid future dividend 
cuts. Collectively, the results of Table 9 suggest that the proportion of seniors is not dynamically 
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related to payout decisions and that earnings volatility is unrelated to the use of dividends but 
positively related to the use of repurchases. Consistent with our panel regressions, the results 
suggest that firm payout policy is driven by factors other than senior demand. This is consistent 
with either indifference on the part of seniors with respect to the decision between dividends and 
repurchases or lack of influence by senior investors over firm decisions.    
 [Insert Table 9 here] 
3.3 Cross-sectional Regressions 
In Table 10 we replicate the cross-sectional regressions of Becker et al. (2011) except 
that we consider age, earnings volatility and earnings growth volatility controls in various 
specifications. The inclusion of these controls eliminates (reduces) the significant relation 
between Seniors and Dividend Payer and Dividend Initiate (Dividend Yield). This highlights the 
importance of considering other factors related to firm payout decisions when examining the role 
of clienteles.  For each dependent variable, we run one specification with the new controls and 
one without. In the specification without the new control variables, we restrict the sample to only 
those observations for which the new controls are available in order to rule out a changing 
sample as an explanation for the observed results. The results do not suggest that the sample is 
responsible for the reduction in significance of seniors.  
[Insert Table 10 here] 
 Table 11 follows the same approach as Table 10 with one important change. We focus on 
the change in seniors in Table 11 instead of the level of seniors from Table 10. Further, while our 
previous change in seniors analysis focuses on year-over-year changes, Table 11 uses decade-
over-decade changes for census years only (i.e., 1990 over 1980 and 2000 over 1990, 
respectively).  
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This approach has two notable benefits. First, while our previous year-over-year analysis 
is econometrically justifiable given the non-stationarity of seniors, the economic implications of 
single year changes in demographics on following year firm decisions can be potentially 
problematic. Specifically, our finding that change in seniors is unrelated to payout may be driven 
by the fact that firms do not respond as quickly to demographic changes as our earlier models 
would suggest. The model used in Table 11 uses the previous ten year change in seniors, which 
should allow for firms to adequately adjust for demographic changes if they so choose. Second, 
it may be argued that our reliance on census estimates based on census year only data yields 
results that are not directly comparable to Becker et al. (2011). The analysis in Table 11 uses 
census year data only, which should alleviate concerns related to the use of estimates.   
The results in Table 11 are consistent with our previous results. Specifically, we find that 
in all but one specification change in seniors is unrelated to payout. The one exception reveals a 
negative relation between change in seniors and dividend yield. Both the insignificant results and 
the negative relation are inconsistent with firms responding to seniors demanding dividends even 
over longer periods. 
[Insert Table 11 here] 
3.4 Robustness 
 In order to ensure our results are not due to the choice of methodology, we consider an 
alternative approach utilized by Fama and French (2001). They employ Fama and MacBeth 
(1973) regressions with payout variables as the dependent variables and firm profitability, asset 
growth, market-to-book, and the NYSE size percentile for a firm in a given year as control 
variables. We use this approach for the dependent variables Dividend Payer, Dividend 
Proportion, and Payout Ratio in Table 12. 
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  Our results are consistent with the earlier analysis. Specifically, change in seniors is 
negatively related to Dividend Payer (significant at the 5% level) and not related to either Payout 
Ratio or Dividend Proportion when our specifications do not control for firm age and earnings 
volatility.   
[Insert Table 12 here] 
 We also confirm that our sample is consistent with census data used in Becker et al. 
(2011). We replicate their cross-sectional regressions focusing on the census years of 1980, 
1990, and 2000 in Table 13. In order to be consistent with Becker et al.’s (2011) analysis, we do 
not use the change in seniors in a county and instead include the level. Once we eliminate the 
time-series nature of our analysis, our results are consistent with Becker et al. (2011). 
Specifically, in Table 13, we find that Seniors is positively related to the propensity to pay 
dividends, the propensity to initiate dividends, and dividend yields (all significant at the 1% 
level). Thus, it does not appear that our results are driven by the use of a different measure of 
seniors than Becker et al. (2011) or other data concerns. 
[Insert Table 13 here] 
  
4. Conclusion  
 The use of dividends has declined over time while the relative importance of repurchases 
has increased (e.g., Fama and French, 2001; Skinner, 2008). Previous work documents the 
importance of firm characteristics and senior clienteles in shaping payout policy. We consider 
both factors and seek to determine which best explains firm payout decisions.  
Previous literature (Becker et al., 2011) documents the existence of a cross-sectional 
senior dividend clientele effect in which individuals over the age of 65 prefer dividends to 
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repurchases or capital gains. In this paper, for the first time, we examine the relation using a full 
panel data set that exploits time-series patterns between seniors and payout policy. Instead of a 
positive relation between seniors and dividends, as found by other authors in the cross section 
(which we confirm), we find a negative relation between the change in seniors and the propensity 
to pay dividends. Further, once we control for firm characteristics including age, size and 
earnings volatility, the relation between senior proportion and payout variables is no longer 
significant. 
 These results are consistent with senior indifference to firm payout or with firms ignoring 
the demands of seniors. Instead of senior clientele demand determining payout policy, we find 
that firm characteristics, coupled with managerial preference for flexibility, drive payout policy. 
Granger-causality tests confirm that senior clientele is not related to use of dividends while 
earnings volatility is positively related to the use of repurchases. This suggests that 
management’s desire for flexibility, particularly when earnings are volatile and less permanent, 
causes them to utilize repurchases.  
Our results are not sensitive to methodology and are not the result of a non-standard 
sample. We provide a comprehensive picture of the impact of seniors and changing firm 
dynamics on U.S. payout policy over the period of 1980-2008. The results may be of particular 
interest as firms decide how to address their payout policies to fit an aging population. 
 
 
26 
 
References 
Baffes, John, 1997, Explaining stationary variables with non-stationary regressors, Applied 
Economics Letters, Taylor and Francis Journals 41:1, 69-75. 
 
Becker, Bo, Zoran Ivkovic, and Scott Weisbenner, 2011, Local dividend clienteles, Journal of 
Finance 66, 655-683. 
 
Brav, Alon, John R. Graham, Campbell R. Harvey, and Roni Michaely, 2005, Payout policy in 
the 21
st
 century, Journal of Financial Economics 77, 483-527. 
 
Brav, Alon, John R. Graham, Campbell R. Harvey, and Roni Michaely, 2008, Managerial 
response to the May 2003 dividend tax cut, Financial Management 37, 611-624. 
 
Coval, Joshua D., and Tobias J. Moskowitz, 1999, Home bias at home: Local equity preference 
in domestic portfolios, Journal of Finance 54, 1–39. 
 
Coval, Joshua D., and Tobias J. Moskowitz, 2001, The geography of investment: Informed 
trading and asset prices, Journal of Political Economy 109, 811–841. 
 
DeAngelo, Harry, and Linda DeAngelo, 2006, The irrelevance of the MM dividend irrelevance 
theorem, Journal of Financial Economics 79, 293-315. 
 
DeAngelo, H., L. DeAngelo, and D.J. Skinner, 2004, Are dividends disappearing? Dividend 
concentrations and the consolidations of earnings, Journal of Financial Economics 72, 425-456. 
 
Denis, David J., and Igor Osobov, 2008, Why do firms pay dividends? International evidence on 
the determinants of dividend policy, Journal of Financial Economics 89, 62-82. 
 
Fama, Eugene F., and Kenneth R. French, 2001, Disappearing dividends: Changing firm 
characteristics or lower propensity to pay? Journal of Financial Economics 60, 3-43.  
 
Fama, Eugene F., J. MacBeth, 1973, Risk, return, and equilibrium: Empirical tests, Journal of 
Political Economy 81, 607-636. 
 
Graham, John R., and Alok Kumar, 2006, Do dividend clienteles exist? Evidence on dividend 
preferences of retail investors, Journal of Finance 61, 1305-1336. 
 
Granger, C. W.J., and P. Newbold, 1974, Spurious regression in Econometrics, Journal of 
Econometrics 2, 111-120. 
 
Grullon, Gustavo, Roni Michaely, and Bhaskaran Swaminathan, 2002, Are dividend changes a 
sign of firm maturity? Journal of Business 75, 387-424. 
 
Grullon, Gustavo, and Roni Michaely, 2004, The information content of share repurchase 
programs, Journal of Finance 59, 651-680. 
 
27 
 
Guay, W. and J. Harford, 2000, The cash flow permanence and information content of dividend 
increases vs. repurchases, Journal of Financial Economics 57, 385-416. 
 
Ha, Inbong, Gwangheon Hong, and Bong-Soo Lee, 2011, The Information content of dividends 
and share repurchases, Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies 40:4, 519-551. 
 
Hadri, Kaddour, 2000, Testing for stationarity in heterogeneous panel data, The Econometrics 
Journal 3, 148-161. 
 
Healy, P.M., and K.G. Palepu, 1988, Earnings information conveyed by dividend initiations and 
omissions, Journal of Financial Economics 21, 149-175. 
 
Im, Kyung So, M. Hashem Pesaran, and Yongcheol Shin, 2003, Testing for unit roots in 
heterogeneous panels, Journal of Econometrics 115, 53-74. 
 
Ivkovic, Zoran, and Scott Weisbenner, 2005, Local does as local is: Information content of the 
geography of individual investors’ common stock investments, Journal of Finance 60, 267-306. 
 
Jagannathan, M., C.P. Stephens and M.S. Weisbach, 2000, Financial flexibility and the choice 
between dividends and stock repurchases, Journal of Financial Economics 57, 355-384. 
 
Kumar, Praveen, Bong-Soo Lee, 2001, Discrete dividend policy with permanent earnings, 
Financial Management 30:3, autumn, 55-76. 
 
Lie, E., 2000, Excess funds and agency problems: An empirical study of incremental cash 
disbursement, Review of Financial Studies 13, 219-248. 
 
 Lee, Bong-Soo, 1996, Time-series implications of aggregate dividend behavior, Review of  
Financial Studies 9:2, 589-618.  
 
Lee, Bong-Soo, Oliver M. Rui, 2007, Time-series behavior of share repurchases and dividends, 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 42, 119-142. 
 
Lee, Bong-Soo, Jungwon Suh, 2011, Cash holdings and share repurchase: International evidence, 
Journal of Corporate Finance (forthcoming). 
 
Miller, Merton H., and Franco Modigliani, 1961, Dividend policy, growth, and the valuation of 
shares, Journal of Business 34, 411-433. 
 
Scholz, John K., 1992, A direct examination of the dividend clientele hypothesis, Journal of 
Public Economics 49, 261–285. 
 
Shefrin, Hersh, and Meir Statman, 1984, Explaining investor preference for cash dividends,  
Journal of Financial Economics 13, 253-282. 
 
28 
 
Shefrin, Hersh, and Richard H. Thaler, 1988, The behavioral life-cycle hypothesis, Economic 
Inquiry 26, 609-643. 
 
Skinner, Douglas J., 2008, The evolving relation between earnings, dividends, and stock 
repurchases, Journal of Financial Economics 87, 582-609. 
 
Thaler, Richard H., and Hersh M. Shefrin, 1981, An economic theory of self-control, Journal of 
Political Economy 89, 392–406. 
 
  
29 
 
Table 1 
Summary Statistics and Stationarity Tests 
 
Dividend Payer is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm pays dividends and zero otherwise. Dividend Initiate 
is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm initiated dividends in a given year and is zero otherwise. Dividend 
Yield is a firm’s dividend yield for the year. Dividend (Repurchase) Proportion is the dollar amount of dividends 
(repurchases) for a given firm year divided by the total firm payout for the same year. Repurchase Yield is the firm’s 
repurchase yield for the year. Repurchase (Dividends) is the dollar amount of firm repurchases (dividends) in a 
given year. Payout Ratio is dividends plus repurchases divided by firm market value. Seniors is the proportion of 
individuals over the age of 65 in a given county. Change in Seniors is the year-over-year change in the proportion of 
seniors in a given county. Hadri (IPS) is the panel stationarity test of Hadri (2000), which has a null hypothesis of 
all panels are stationary (Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003) which assumes that all panels are non-stationary under the 
null). 
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
  Mean Median Min  Max SD N 
Dividend Payer (%) 39.67 0.00 0 100.00 48.92 53,568 
Dividend Initiate (%) 1.38 0.00 0 100.00 11.67 53,568 
Dividend Yield (%) 1.79 0.77 0 10.74 2.44 53,396 
Dividend Proportion 0.43 0.32 0 1.00 0.43 59,842 
Repurchase Yield (%) 0.78 0.13 0 11.43 1.84 59,842 
Repurchase ($1000s) 59,268 1,516 0 921,000 167,666 59,842 
Dividends ($1000s) 33,104 1,385 0 502,245 91,352 59,842 
Payout Ratio 0.16 0.04 0 170.14 1.16 59,842 
Repurchase Proportion 0.57 0.68 0 1.00 0.43 59,842 
Seniors 0.12 0.12 0.03 0.33 0.03 59,842 
Change in Seniors 0.000 0.001 -0.139 0.218 0.002 59,842 
 
Panel B: Stationarity Tests 
  Hadri - Reject Stationarity IPS - Reject Non-stationarity 
Dividend Payer (%) yes yes 
Dividend Initiate (%) yes yes 
Dividend Yield (%) yes yes 
Dividend Proportion yes yes 
Repurchase Yield (%) yes yes 
Repurchase ($1000s) yes yes 
Dividends ($1000s) yes yes 
Total Payout ($1000s) yes yes 
Repurchase Proportion yes yes 
Seniors yes no 
Change in Seniors yes yes 
Log of Market Value yes no 
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Table 2 
County Sorts by Change in Seniors Over Each Decade 
 
We sort our sample so that counties with the smallest influx of seniors (or a decline in seniors) over the decade 
examined are found in quintile 1 and counties with the largest increase in seniors are found in quintile 5. Within 
each quintile firms are aggregated so that county affiliation is no longer relevant. Within each quintile, Firms is the 
number of firms in the quintile, Mean Size is the average market value for a firm in the quintile (in millions), 
Dividend Payer% is the percentage of firms that pay dividends, Dividend Proportion% is the percentage of 
distributions that are granted via dividends.  
 
    1980-1989     
 Senior % Firms Mean Size Dividend Payer% 
Dividend Proportion 
% 
1 1274 678 42.75% 40.16 
2 1212 550 37.38% 46.11 
3 650 736 48.77% 47.98 
4 493 709 49.70% 43.41 
5 524 465 46.20% 45.28 
     
 
  1990-1999     
 Senior % Firms Mean Size Dividend Payer% 
Dividend Proportion 
% 
1 1366 3721 35.45% 35.47 
2 1101 2027 38.43% 43.16 
3 1098 2291 31.73% 42.08 
4 1118 3192 30.75% 34.65 
5 524 1595 34.73% 27.55 
     
 
  2000-2008     
Senior % Firms Mean Size Dividend Payer% 
Dividend Proportion 
% 
1 569 2866 54.64% 29.69 
2 851 2852 48.94% 33.68 
3 736 4070 49.66% 18.19 
4 490 2904 47.35% 21.78 
5 514 2747 35.01% 18.91 
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Table 3 
Dividend Payout and Change in Seniors  
 
Change in Seniors is the year-over-year change in the proportion of seniors in a given county. Net Income, Cash, 
and Long-Term Debt are scaled by total assets. Q is approximated using the market-to-book ratio. Volatility is the 
standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the prior two years. Two-year Lagged Return is the monthly stock 
returns over the prior two years. Change in Size is the year over year change in the natural log of firm market value.  
Log of Assets is the natural log of total assets.  Asset Growth is the natural log of the growth rate of total assets over 
the prior year. Additionally, we include age-group indicator variables which are dummies for firms between 1-5, 6-
10, 11-15, and 16-20 years, as well as industry-year interaction dummy, and state-year interaction dummy variables. 
Robust standard errors which are clustered by firm are used in all regressions. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. 
**
, and 
*
 indicate statistical significance at 1%, and 5% levels, respectively. 
  Dividend        
Payer      
Dividend 
Initiate 
Dividend   
Yield 
Dividend 
Proportion   
Change in Seniors -533.582* 7.151 0.803 -5.360* 
 
(218.638) (26.770) (10.373) (2.303) 
Net Income 1.445 0.399** 0.107 0.023 
 
(1.146) (0.109) (0.092) (0.013) 
Cash -40.892** 0.392 -1.018** -0.381** 
 
(2.639) (0.280) (0.126) (0.035) 
Q -0.510* -0.079** -0.003 0.004 
 
(0.211) (0.015) (0.018) (0.002) 
Debt -11.584** 0.181 0.573** -0.061** 
 
(1.607) (0.180) (0.102) (0.023) 
Volatility -184.005** -3.599** -7.337** -1.300** 
 
(11.765) (0.363) (0.499) (0.147) 
Two-Year Lagged Return 1.518** 0.150** 0.026** 0.021** 
 
(0.175) (0.034) (0.008) (0.003) 
Change in Size 4.611** 0.555** 0.075** 0.009* 
 
(0.300) (0.068) (0.020) (0.004) 
Log of Assets 0.111** -0.003** 0.004** -0.000** 
 
(0.025) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 
Asset Growth -0.178 -0.048* -0.003 -0.001 
 
(0.096) (0.024) (0.003) (0.001) 
Constant 75.152** 2.869** 2.247** 0.693** 
 
(1.673) (0.354) (0.077) (0.020) 
Observations 95,054 95,054 94,682 59,842 
R-squared 0.30 0.01 0.19 0.18 
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Table 4 
Change in Seniors, Repurchases, and Payout Ratio 
 
Change in Seniors is the year-over-year change in the proportion of seniors in a given county. Net Income, Cash, 
and Long-Term Debt are scaled by total assets. Q is approximated using the market-to-book ratio. Volatility is the 
standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the prior two years. Two-year Lagged Return is the monthly stock 
returns over the prior two years. Change in Size is the year over year change in the natural log of firm market value. 
Log of Assets is the natural log of total assets.  Asset Growth is the natural log of the growth rate of total assets over 
the prior year. Additionally, we include age-group indicator variables which are dummies for firms between 1-5, 6-
10, 11-15, and 16-20 years, as well as industry-year interaction dummy, and state-year interaction dummy variables. 
Robust standard errors which are clustered by firm are used in all regressions. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. 
**
, and 
*
 indicate statistical significance at 1%, and 5% levels, respectively. 
  
Repurchase Yield 
Repurchase 
Proportion Payout Ratio   
Change in Seniors 1.927 5.360* 0.396 
 
(18.259) (2.303) (2.657) 
Net Income -0.052 -0.023 -0.015 
 
(0.037) (0.013) (0.014) 
Cash -0.232 0.381** -0.004 
 
(0.234) (0.035) (0.034) 
Q -0.085** -0.004 -0.006** 
 
(0.016) (0.002) (0.001) 
Debt 0.780** 0.061** 0.155** 
 
(0.237) (0.023) (0.056) 
Volatility 5.075** 1.300** 0.431** 
 
(0.703) (0.147) (0.074) 
Two-Year Lagged Return -0.182** -0.021** 0.009** 
 
(0.036) (0.003) (0.003) 
Change in Size 0.439** -0.009* -0.168** 
 
(0.071) (0.004) (0.019) 
Log of Assets 0.000 0.000** 0.000 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Asset Growth 0.193 0.001 0.008 
 
(0.140) (0.001) (0.006) 
Constant 0.033 0.307** 0.017 
 
(0.138) (0.020) (0.020) 
Observations 92,621 59,871 92,452 
R-squared 0.02 0.18 0.02 
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Table 5 
Change in Seniors and Firm Characteristics 
 
Size is the natural log of market value. Age is the number of years since the firm’s IPO. Earnings Volatility (Earn. 
Growth Vol.) is the standard deviation of operating income (growth) over the previous five years from year -4 to 0. 
Profit is net income divided by equity. Change in Seniors is the year-over-year change in the proportion of seniors 
in a given county. Net Income, Cash, and Long-Term Debt are scaled by total assets. Q is approximated using the 
market-to-book ratio. Volatility is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the prior two years. Two-year 
Lagged Return is the monthly stock returns over the prior two years. Change in Size is the year over year change in 
the natural log of firm market value. Log of Assets is the natural log of total assets.  Asset Growth is the natural log 
of the growth rate of total assets over the prior year. Additionally, we include age-group indicator variables which 
are dummies for firms between 1-5, 6-10, 11-15, and 16-20 years, as well as industry-year interaction dummy, and 
state-year interaction dummy variables. Robust standard errors which are clustered by firm, are used in all 
regressions. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
**
, and 
*
 indicate statistical significance at 1%, and 5% 
levels, respectively. 
 
  Size Age 
Earnings 
Volatility 
Earn. 
Growth Vol. Profit 
Change in Seniors -28.128** -48.747** 12.847** 21.629** 0.040 
 
(9.853) (13.001) (4.942) (6.497) (0.220) 
Net Income 0.113* 0.037 -0.089* -0.074 0.025* 
 
(0.052) (0.024) (0.037) (0.041) (0.012) 
Cash -0.526** -0.813** 2.050** 1.258** 0.012 
 
(0.114) (0.114) (0.084) (0.095) (0.008) 
Q 0.089** 0.008 0.105** -0.012 -0.008** 
 
(0.015) (0.007) (0.012) (0.008) (0.001) 
Debt 0.455** 0.172** 0.293** -0.220** 0.007 
 
(0.116) (0.066) (0.036) (0.047) (0.006) 
Volatility -6.407** -1.470** 5.071** 5.763** -0.083** 
 
(0.337) (0.136) (0.307) (0.415) (0.013) 
Two-Year Lagged Return 0.163** -0.008 -0.057** -0.033** 0.005** 
 
(0.013) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.001) 
Change in Size 0.576** 0.048** -0.237** -0.109** 0.005* 
 
(0.018) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.002) 
Log of Assets 0.014** 0.006* -0.003** -0.001** -0.000** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Asset Growth 0.040* -0.012 0.035** 0.009* -0.005* 
 
(0.019) (0.008) (0.007) (0.004) (0.003) 
Constant 11.631** 17.373** -4.210** -1.329** 0.005 
 
(0.065) (0.061) (0.043) (0.055) (0.003) 
Observations 107,184 107,184 95,290 87,988 107,183 
R-squared 0.389 0.904 0.389 0.228 0.159 
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Table 6 
Dividend Payout and Change in Seniors  
Change in Seniors is the year-over-year change in the proportion of seniors in a given county. Size is the natural log 
of market value. Age is the number of years since the firm’s IPO. Earnings Volatility is the standard deviation of 
operating income over the previous five years from year -4 to 0. Net Income, Cash, and Long-Term Debt are scaled 
by total assets. Q is approximated using the market-to-book ratio. Volatility is the standard deviation of monthly 
stock returns over the prior two years. Return is the monthly stock returns over the prior two years. Change in Size is 
the year over year change in the natural log of firm market value.  Log of Assets is the natural log of total assets.  
Asset Growth is the natural log of the growth rate of total assets over the prior year. Additionally, we include age-
group indicator variables which are dummies for firms between 1-5, 6-10, 11-15, and 16-20 years, as well as 
industry-year interaction dummy, and state-year interaction dummy variables. Robust standard errors which are 
clustered by firm are used in all regressions. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.
**
, and 
*
 indicate statistical 
significance at 1%, and 5% levels, respectively. 
  Dividend Payer      Dividend Initiate Dividend Yield Dividend Proportion 
Change in Seniors -201.012 5.655 16.428 -3.922 
 
(208.315) (27.789) (9.401) (2.383) 
Size 5.989** -0.004 0.127** 0.005 
 
(0.229) (0.022) (0.011) (0.003) 
Age 0.711** -0.035** 0.014** 0.006** 
 
(0.087) (0.013) (0.004) (0.001) 
Earnings Volatility -11.435** -0.012 -0.467** -0.063** 
 
(0.321) (0.040) (0.017) (0.005) 
Net Income -1.698 0.436** -0.005 0.019 
 
(1.063) (0.128) (0.088) (0.010) 
Cash -13.363** 0.623* 0.101 -0.255** 
 
(2.186) (0.303) (0.116) (0.031) 
Q 0.261 -0.065** 0.040* 0.010** 
 
(0.240) (0.017) (0.020) (0.002) 
Debt -16.051** 0.499** 0.029 -0.141** 
 
(1.615) (0.191) (0.085) (0.019) 
Volatility -74.515** -3.585** -2.976** -0.899** 
 
(7.349) (0.451) (0.319) (0.135) 
Return -0.070 0.143** -0.023** 0.015** 
 
(0.126) (0.036) (0.007) (0.003) 
Change in Size -1.596** 0.522** -0.149** -0.007 
 
(0.276) (0.070) (0.018) (0.004) 
Log of Assets -0.021* -0.002** 0.000 -0.000** 
 
(0.009) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Asset Growth 0.097 -0.036 0.011** 0.001* 
 
(0.089) (0.022) (0.002) (0.001) 
Constant -57.346** 2.596** -1.276** 0.245** 
 
(3.269) (0.425) (0.147) (0.053) 
Observations 84,621 84,621 84,301 55,116 
R-squared 0.421 0.006 0.286 0.205 
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 Table 7 
Change in Seniors and Small Firm Interaction 
 
Change in Seniors is the year-over-year change in the proportion of seniors in a given county. Small is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the firm is below median market value and is zero otherwise. Controls include the following. 
Size is the natural log of market value. Age is the number of years since the firm’s IPO. Earnings Volatility is the 
standard deviation of operating income over the previous five years from year -4 to 0.  Net Income, Cash, and Long-
Term Debt are scaled by total assets. Q is approximated using the market-to-book ratio. Volatility is the standard 
deviation of monthly stock returns over the prior two years. Return is the monthly stock returns over the prior two 
years. Change in Size is the year over year change in the natural log of firm market value. Log of Assets is the 
natural log of total assets.  Asset Growth is the natural log of the growth rate of total assets over the prior year. 
Additionally, we include age-group indicator variables which are dummies for firms between 1-5, 6-10, 11-15, and 
16-20 years, as well as industry-year interaction dummy, and state-year interaction dummy variables. Robust 
standard errors which are clustered by firm are used in all regressions. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  
**
, and 
*
 indicate statistical significance at 1%, and 5% levels, respectively. 
 
  
Dividend Payer 
Dividend 
Proportion Payout Ratio   
Change in Seniors -81.589 -4.281 1.005 
 
(211.576) (2.559) (3.275) 
Small -22.264** -0.138** -0.003 
 
(1.178) (0.017) (0.013) 
Change in Seniors x Small -973.065* 2.143 -4.631 
 
(465.512) (4.912) (4.006) 
Constant -57.497** 0.245** 0.157** 
 
(3.269) (0.053) (0.037) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 84,621 55,116 83,615 
R-squared 0.421 0.205 0.016 
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Table 8 
Change in Seniors and the 2003 Tax Change 
 
Change in Seniors is the year-over-year change in the proportion of seniors in a given county. Post 2003 is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the year is after 2003 and is zero otherwise. Controls include the following. Size is the 
natural log of market value. Age is the number of years since the firm’s IPO. Earnings Volatility is the standard 
deviation of operating income over the previous five years from year -4 to 0. Net Income, Cash, and Long-Term 
Debt are scaled by total assets. Q is approximated using the market-to-book ratio. Volatility is the standard deviation 
of monthly stock returns over the prior two years. Return is the monthly stock returns over the prior two years. 
Change in Size is the year over year change in the natural log of firm market value. Log of Assets is the natural log 
of total assets.  Asset Growth is the natural log of the growth rate of total assets over the prior year. Additionally, we 
include age-group indicator variables which are dummies for firms between 1-5, 6-10, 11-15, and 16-20 years, as 
well as industry-year interaction dummy, and state-year interaction dummy variables. Robust standard errors which 
are clustered by firm are used in all regressions. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
**
, and 
*
 indicate 
statistical significance at 1%, and 5% levels, respectively. 
 
  
Dividend Payer 
Dividend 
Proportion Payout Ratio   
Change in Seniors -137.834 -4.978* 1.726 
 
(219.892) (2.581) (3.461) 
Post 2003 -19.787*** -0.052*** -0.053** 
 
(1.363) (0.014) (0.022) 
Change in Seniors x Post 2003 -689.282 4.517 -5.694 
 
(488.206) (5.000) (4.183) 
Constant -12.828*** 0.541*** 0.198*** 
 
(3.393) (0.042) (0.037) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 95069 59858 92433 
R-squared 0.36 0.19 0.02 
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Table 9 
Granger-causality 
 
We specify the following model: 
       (
       
        
             
)  (
   ( )       ( )    ( ) 
   ( )       ( )       ( )
   ( )       ( )       ( )
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)  (
   
   
   
)          (1) 
Where Payout is either Dividend Payer, Dividend Yield, Dividend Proportion or Repurchase Yield depending on the 
specification and each is defined as in previous tables. Seniors is either Level of Seniors or Change in Seniors 
depending on the specification. Level of Seniors is the proportion of seniors in a given county and Change in Seniors 
is the year over year change in the proportion of seniors in a given county. Earnings Vol is the standard deviation of 
operating income over the previous five years from year -4 to 0.Joint Test refers to the F test statistic from a test of 
the causal relation. Net (cumulative) Direction is the sum of the coefficients from the lags of the variable examined, 
reported as either positive (+) or negative (-). Net (cumulative) Significance refers to the Chi-Square statistic of the 
sum of the coefficients from the lags of  the variable of interest, and the significance of the test is based on a Chi-
Square test. 
**
, and 
*
 indicate statistical significance at 1%, and 5% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 Granger-cause Dividend Payer  
Dividend Payer Joint Test  Net (cumulative) Direction Net (cumulative) Significance 
Level of Seniors 4.71 - 4.71* 
    Earnings Volatility 3.45 - 0.73 
    Change in Seniors 6.08* - 1.39 
    
Earnings Volatility 0.48 - 0.07 
    
 
Granger-cause Dividend Yield 
Dividend Yield Joint Test  Net (cumulative) Direction Net (cumulative) Significance 
Level of Seniors 3.88 - 0.99 
    Earnings Volatility 0.01 + 0.01 
    Change in Seniors 4.16 + 3.14 
 
   Earnings Volatility 0.3 + 0.01 
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Granger-cause Dividend Proportion  
Dividend Proportion Joint Test  Net (cumulative) Direction Net (cumulative) Significance 
Level of Seniors 10.67** - 9.86** 
    Earnings Volatility 4.97* + 4.56* 
    Change in Seniors 1.19 + 1.18 
 
   Earnings Volatility 0.57 + 0.46 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Granger-cause Repurchase Yield 
Repurchase Yield Joint Test  Net (cumulative) Direction Net (cumulative) Significance 
Level of Seniors 0.45 - 0.45 
    Earnings Volatility 13.55** + 5.95* 
    Change in Seniors 0.27 + 0.04 
 
   Earnings Volatility 13.15** + 5.29* 
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Table 10 
Cross-Sectional Regressions 
 
Seniors is the proportion of seniors in a given county. Size is the natural log of market value. Age is the number of 
years since the firm’s IPO. Earnings Volatility is the standard deviation of operating income over the previous five 
years from year -4 to 0. Net Income, Cash, and Long-Term Debt are scaled by total assets. Q is approximated using 
the market-to-book ratio. Volatility is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the prior two years. 
Return is the monthly stock returns over the prior two years. Size is the natural log of firm market value. Log of 
Assets is the natural log of total assets.  Asset Growth is the natural log of the growth rate of total assets over the 
prior year.  Additionally, we include age-group indicator variables which are dummies for firms between 1-5, 6-10, 
11-15, and 16-20 years, as well as industry-year interaction dummy, and state-year interaction dummy variables. 
Robust standard errors which are clustered by firm are used in all regressions. Standard errors are reported in 
parentheses. 
**
, and 
*
 indicate statistical significance at 1%, and 5% levels, respectively. 
  Dividend        
Payer      
Dividend        
Payer      
Dividend 
Initiate 
Dividend 
Initiate 
Dividend   
Yield 
Dividend   
Yield   
Seniors 42.164 51.821* 13.827 13.966 2.075* 2.401* 
 
(22.308) (22.996) (7.503) (7.474) (1.055) (1.068) 
Size 5.140** 6.944** 0.249** 0.251** 0.062** 0.120** 
 
(0.283) (0.276) (0.085) (0.088) (0.014) (0.014) 
Age 0.577** 
 
-0.094 
 
0.013 
 
 
(0.188) 
 
(0.072) 
 
(0.010) 
 Earnings Volatility -2.293** 
 
0.009 
 
0.003 
 
 
(0.621) 
 
(0.248) 
 
(0.049) 
 Earn. Growth Vol. -5.464** 
 
-0.021 
 
-0.214** 
 
 
(0.403) 
 
(0.130) 
 
(0.025) 
 Net Income 1.132 2.175* 0.142 0.163 0.263 0.288 
 
(1.420) (1.020) (0.168) (0.129) (0.144) (0.154) 
Cash -10.798** -16.770** 0.825 0.860 -0.234 -0.350 
 
(3.382) (3.406) (0.912) (0.918) (0.218) (0.214) 
Q -0.160 -0.362 -0.024 -0.022 0.018 0.017 
 
(0.176) (0.209) (0.036) (0.039) (0.014) (0.015) 
Debt -15.584** -15.458** -0.441 -0.413 -0.286* -0.278* 
 
(2.275) (2.283) (0.494) (0.494) (0.139) (0.140) 
Volatility -32.443** -49.076** -0.053 -0.060 -1.541** -2.017** 
 
(4.811) (5.906) (0.725) (0.677) (0.253) (0.281) 
Return -0.755** -1.038** -0.045 -0.049 -0.029** -0.042** 
 
(0.237) (0.278) (0.029) (0.031) (0.011) (0.012) 
Log of Assets -0.014 -0.031 -0.024 -0.025 0.000 -0.001 
 
(0.018) (0.020) (0.024) (0.024) (0.001) (0.001) 
Asset Growth -0.514** -0.829** -0.000 0.001 -0.016 -0.023 
 
(0.185) (0.232) (0.038) (0.036) (0.013) (0.015) 
Constant -35.386** -14.599** -0.960 -3.617* 1.786** 2.048** 
 
(6.845) (4.676) (2.455) (1.549) (0.361) (0.208) 
Observations 6,692 6,692 3,889 3,889 6,662 6,662 
R-squared 0.527 0.504 0.099 0.099 0.420 0.410 
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Table 11 
Decade Change in Seniors 
Change in Seniors is the decade-over-decade (1990 over 1980 and 2000 over 1990, respectively) change in the 
proportion of seniors in a given county. Size is the natural log of market value. Age is the number of years since the 
firm’s IPO. Earnings Volatility is the standard deviation of operating income over the previous five years from year 
-4 to 0. Net Income, Cash, and Long-Term Debt are scaled by total assets. Q is approximated using the market-to-
book ratio. Volatility is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the prior two years. Return is the 
monthly stock returns over the prior two years. Size is the natural log of firm market value. Log of Assets is the 
natural log of total assets.  Asset Growth is the natural log of the growth rate of total assets over the prior year.  
Additionally, we include age-group indicator variables which are dummies for firms between 1-5, 6-10, 11-15, and 
16-20 years, as well as industry-year interaction dummy, and state-year interaction dummy variables. Robust 
standard errors which are clustered by firm are used in all regressions. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
**
, and 
*
 indicate statistical significance at 1%, and 5% levels, respectively. 
  Dividend        
Payer      
Dividend        
Payer      
Dividend 
Initiate 
Dividend 
Initiate 
Dividend   
Yield 
Dividend   
Yield   
Change in Seniors  -26.012 -25.427 4.066 -0.337 -1.883* -1.900 
 
(21.033) (21.328) (6.245) (5.530) (1.109) (1.209) 
Size 4.963*** 6.894*** -0.020 -0.076* 0.082*** 0.185*** 
 
(0.282) (0.277) (0.048) (0.045) (0.015) (0.015) 
Age 0.590*** 
 
-0.031 
 
0.016* 
 
 
(0.175) 
 
(0.028) 
 
(0.009) 
 Earnings Volatility -8.170*** 
 
0.088 
 
-0.427*** 
 
 
(0.532) 
 
(0.147) 
 
(0.029) 
 Earn. Growth Vol. -5.330*** 
 
-0.019 
 
-0.180*** 
 
 
(0.414) 
 
(0.124) 
 
(0.021) 
 Net Income -0.010 1.316 0.385 0.510** 0.058 0.133 
 
(1.606) (1.069) (0.245) (0.253) (0.103) (0.100) 
Cash -13.598*** -31.771*** 0.652 0.418 -0.194 -1.044*** 
 
(3.460) (3.398) (0.824) (0.663) (0.191) (0.189) 
Q 0.045 -0.755** -0.013 -0.008 0.029* -0.017 
 
(0.202) (0.306) (0.033) (0.031) (0.017) (0.019) 
Debt -18.122*** -14.794*** -0.061 0.059 -0.152 0.508*** 
 
(2.248) (2.152) (0.561) (0.553) (0.120) (0.154) 
Volatility -46.738*** -109.169*** -2.271*** -2.380*** -1.820*** -5.460*** 
 
(5.820) (8.504) (0.798) (0.783) (0.272) (0.453) 
Return -0.939*** -0.996*** 0.029 0.059* -0.039*** -0.035** 
 
(0.261) (0.293) (0.032) (0.035) (0.012) (0.014) 
Log of Assets -0.002 0.023 -0.002 -0.002* 0.001 0.001 
 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Asset Growth -0.172 -0.910*** 0.008 -0.019 0.018** -0.021* 
 
(0.187) (0.289) (0.037) (0.037) (0.008) (0.011) 
Constant -55.164*** -13.799*** 1.369 2.048*** -1.561*** 0.196 
 
(4.068) (4.267) (0.869) (0.703) (0.221) (0.230) 
Observations 6,519 7,929 6,519 7,929 6,492 7,889 
R-squared 0.454 0.355 0.004 0.003 0.298 0.191 
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Table 12 
Fama and MacBeth (1973) Regressions 
 
Change in Seniors is the year-over-year change in the proportion of seniors in a given county. Profit is net income 
divided by equity. Asset Growth is the natural log of the growth rate of total assets over the prior year. Market to 
Book is market value divided by book value of equity. Percentile is the NYSE size percentile that the firm falls in 
for a given year. In the spirit of Fama and MacBeth (1973) and following Fama and French (2001), logit regressions 
are estimated each year and the standard deviation of the yearly coefficients are used for inference. Standard errors 
are reported in parentheses. 
**
, and 
*
 indicate statistical significance at 1%, and 5% levels, respectively. 
 
  
Dividend Payer 
Dividend 
Proportion Payout Ratio   
Change in Seniors -849.344* -0.452 -21.191 
 
(331.525) (44.258) (13.148) 
Profit 27.929* 2.794** 1.718** 
 
(12.312) (0.517) (0.606) 
Asset Growth -2.910** 0.008 -0.106** 
 
(0.516) (0.047) (0.032) 
Market to Book -2.193** -0.049* -0.072** 
 
(0.258) (0.019) (0.010) 
Percentile 0.797** 0.004 0.024** 
 
(0.040) (0.004) (0.002) 
Constant 24.917** 1.471** 0.951** 
 
(1.067) (0.102) (0.043) 
Observations 115,747 115,747 115,256 
R-squared 0.239 0.003 0.090 
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Table 13 
Replication of Becker et al. (2011) 
 
Seniors is the proportion of seniors in a given county.  Net Income, Cash, and Long-Term Debt are scaled by total 
assets. Q is approximated using the market-to-book ratio. Volatility is the standard deviation of monthly stock 
returns over the prior two years. Return is the monthly stock returns over the prior two years. Size is the natural log 
of firm market value. Log of Assets is the natural log of total assets.  Asset Growth is the natural log of the growth 
rate of total assets over the prior year.  Additionally, we include age-group indicator variables which are dummies 
for firms between 1-5, 6-10, 11-15, and 16-20 years, as well as industry-year interaction dummy, and state-year 
interaction dummy variables. Robust standard errors which are clustered by firm are used in all regressions. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
**
, and 
*
 indicate statistical significance at 1%, and 5% levels, 
respectively. 
  Dividend Payer      Dividend Initiate Dividend   Yield 
Seniors 64.107** 13.146* 4.073** 
 
(17.087) (5.314) (1.083) 
Net Income -0.143 0.046 0.049 
 
(0.496) (0.074) (0.053) 
Cash -18.650** 0.252 -0.568** 
 
(2.136) (0.630) (0.151) 
Q -0.937** -0.057 -0.030** 
 
(0.189) (0.031) (0.011) 
Debt -13.943** -0.495 0.039 
 
(1.848) (0.560) (0.183) 
Volatility -39.332** -1.005 -2.362** 
 
(3.216) (0.661) (0.194) 
Two-Year Lagged Return -0.595** 0.056 -0.054** 
 
(0.208) (0.039) (0.012) 
Size 7.624** 0.270** 0.203** 
 
(0.213) (0.080) (0.014) 
Log of Assets 0.001 -0.009 0.001 
 
(0.009) (0.006) (0.001) 
Asset Growth -0.055 -0.035 -0.003 
 
(0.037) (0.026) (0.001) 
Firm Age 1 -5 -28.196** -0.826 -0.691** 
 
(1.468) (0.686) (0.091) 
Firm Age 6-10 -17.835** -0.787 -0.394** 
 
(1.503) (0.680) (0.086) 
Firm Age 11-15 -14.629** -0.848 -0.336** 
 
(1.632) (0.746) (0.096) 
Firm Age 16-20 -9.608** 0.070 -0.079 
 
(1.411) (0.835) (0.082) 
Constant 9.680 -2.381 1.080 
 
(10.349) (2.515) (0.847) 
Observations 12,361 6,286 12,297 
R-squared 0.486 0.102 0.377 
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Figure 1. Time-series national (firm) averages for percent seniors (dividend payers, repurchase proportion, and 
earnings volatility) for Compustat firms from 1980-2008. Percent seniors is the proportion of the county’s 
population which is age 65 or over. Dividend payer is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm pays dividends and 
zero otherwise. Repurchase proportion is the dollar amount of firm repurchases divided by total payout (i.e., 
repurchases plus dividends). Earnings Volatility is the standard deviation of operating income over the previous five 
years from year -4 to 0. 
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